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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 














DOCKET NO. 36036 
• 
-----------------------) 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
GREG S. SILVEY 
P.O. BOX 956 




The Honorable Peter D. McDermott 
District Judge 
LORI A. FLEMING 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, 10 83720-0010 
ATTORNEY FOR 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 1 
The district court erred in denying the Rule 33 motion for withdrawal of 
guilty plea .................................................................................... 1 
CONCLUSiON ...................................................................................................... 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................... .4 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) ....................................... ......... 1-2 
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 982 P .2d 931 (1999) .......................................... 1 
Smith v State, S.E.2d _ (Ga.2010) ... ..... , .. , ........................... '" ....... 2-3 
Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.App. 878, _ S.E.2d _ (July 8,2010) ............ '" ..... 2-3 
II 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE RULE 33 MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
The State in its supplemental response brief argues that there is nothing 
about the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 
(2010), nor the adoption of I.C.R. 11 (d)(2), which provides any basis for 
overruling this Court's decision in Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 982 P.2d 931 
(1999). Actually, both provide a basis. 
Most important is the fact that the criminal rule now requires the very 
thing which Ray held was not required, to wit, that the defendant shall be advised 
of the sex offender registration requirement before pleading guilty to an offense 
for which registration is required. In short, Appellant asserts for all of the 
reasons already stated, this Court should now decide in light of Padilla and 
I.C.R. 11 (d)(2) that the district court is required to inform the defendant of the 
sex offender registration requirement in order for his guilty plea to be valid as a 
matter of due process and/or is a requirement of state law which if violated, 
entitles a defendant to its withdrawal. 
But even if this Court does not agree with the above, it must be 
remembered that Ray was a post conviction case with two holdings. First, it held 
that the judge's failure to advise the defendant of the sex offender registration 
requirement did not render his guilty plea involuntary. Second, it held that the 
defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 
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also failed to advise him of the sex offender registration requirement because it 
was a collateral consequence. As to this, Ray stated: 
The Sixth Amendment contains no implied duty for an attorney to 
inform his client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Carter 
v. State, 116 Idaho 468,469, 776 P.2d 830, 831 (Ct.App.1989); see 
also Jones v. State, 118 Idaho 842, 844, 801 P.2d 49, 51 
(Ct.App.1990) (holding that failure to inform defendant of the effect 
an escape conviction would have on a plea agreement was a 
collateral consequence and did not rise to the constitutional 
threshold of ineffective assistance of counsel); Retamoza v. State, 
125 Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 P.2d 603, 607-08 (Ct.App.1994) 
(holding that counsel's failure to advise a client about the 
opportunity to request a judicial recommendation against 
deportation is a matter collateral to the criminal proceeding, to 
which the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
does not extend). Because we hold that sex offender registration is 
a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, counsel did not render 
ineffective assistance in not informing Ray, prior to entry of his plea, 
that he would be required to register as a sex offender. 
Id., 133 Idaho at 102,982 P.2d at 937. 
In short, this secondary holding of Ray is now abrogated by Padilla and 
the failure of counsel to advise a defendant of the sex offender registration 
should be a cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Significantly, this was the conclusion of a recent Georgia appellate case. 
While the State quite naturally relies heavily on an immigration advice decision 
from the Supreme Court of Georgia, Smith v. State, _ S.E.2d _, 2010 WL 
2557336 (Ga. June 28,2010), it fails to mention the even more recent decision of 
the Georgia Court of Appeals which concerns sex offender registration. 
In Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.App. 878, _ S.E.2d _ (July 8, 2010), the 
Georgia Court of Appeals held that consideration of the same factors that Padilla 
considered for deportation, results in the conclusion that even if sex offender 
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registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the failure to advise a 
client that his guilty plea will require registration is constitutionally deficient 
performance. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged the Georgia Supreme 
Court's holding in Smith, supra, but distinguished it as concerning the failure of a 
trial court and not counsel, and noted that Smith mentioned but did not resolve 
whether the direct versus indirect consequences distinction should ever be 
applied in the ineffective assistance of counsel context. 
Also unlike Smith, Taylor did not mention that requiring advice about sex 
offender registration in a sex offense case would result in an unrealistic burden 
of having to determine all of the possible potential important consequences of a 
plea to a particular defendant. Instead, Taylor found that such advice was 
required under prevailing professional norms and that there was no question that 
the defendant would be required to register. Our case is the same, Appellant 
would obviously be required to register given his plea to rape. More 
importantly, Appellant is not requesting the district court anticipate every possible 
important consequence, but merely to follow the rule which requires the court to 
inform the defendant of the sex offender registration requirement where he is 
pleading guilty to an offense requiring registration. 
So to summarize, Appellant asserts that the trial court's failure to advise a 
defendant of the sex offender registration requirement allows withdrawal of the 
guilty plea, or in the alternative, counsel's failure to do so is at the very least a 
cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated above and in all of the previous briefing, Mr. 
Flowers respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction or reverse the 
Order denying his Rule 33 motion and remand this matter to the district court for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea. In the alternative and secondarily, Appellant 
requests his sentence be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing 
before a different judge, or as a further alternative, to reduce his sentence of 15 
years with the first 5 years fixed to one which is ~nable under the 
/ / 
circumstances. t. ~ / //// 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2010./// // 
//~ 
~------/ Gr S. $ffvey 
ornJi for Appellant 
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